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Abstract
From a liberal perspective, pluralism and viewpoint diversity are seen as a necessary condition for a well-functioning
democracy. Recently, there have been claims that viewpoint diversity is diminishing in online social networks, putting
users in a “bubble”, where they receive political information which they agree with. The contributions from our in-
vestigations are fivefold: (1) we introduce different dimensions of the highly complex value viewpoint diversity using
political theory; (2) we provide an overview of the metrics used in the literature of viewpoint diversity analysis; (3)
we operationalize new metrics using the theory and provide a framework to analyze viewpoint diversity in Twitter for
different political cultures; (4) we share our results for a case study on minorities we performed for Turkish and Dutch
Twitter users; (5) we show that minority users cannot reach a large percentage of Turkish Twitter users. With the
last of these contributions, using theory from communication scholars and philosophers, we show how minority access
is missing from the typical dimensions of viewpoint diversity studied by computer scientists and the impact it has on
viewpoint diversity analysis.
Keywords: Twitter, diversity, polarization, politics, Turkey, Netherlands
1. Introduction
It is well known that traditional media have a bias in
selecting what to report and in choosing a perspective on a
particular topic. Individual factors such as personal judg-
ment can play a role during the selection of news for a
newspaper. Selection bias, organizational factors, adver-
tiser and government influences can all affect which items
will become news (Bozdag, 2013). About 37% of Ameri-
cans see a great deal of political bias in news coverage and
68% percent prefer to get political news from sources that
have no particular point of view (Pew Research, 2012).
Similarly, in a survey performed before the general elec-
tions in the UK, 96% of the population said they believe
they have seen clear bias within the UK media (Wei et al.,
2013). Evidence of bias ranges from the topic choice of
the New York Times to the choice of think-tanks that the
media refer to (DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007).
Many democracy theorists claim that modern delibera-
tive democracy requires citizens to have socially validated
and justifiable preferences. Citizens must be exposed to
opposed preferences and viewpoints and should be able
to defend their views (Held, 2006; Offe & Preuss, 1990;
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Dryzek, 1994). Exposure to biased news information can
foster intolerance to opposing viewpoints, lead to ideolog-
ical segregation and antagonisms in major political and
social issues (Glynn et al., 2004; An et al., 2012; Saez-
Trumper et al., 2013). Being aware of and overcoming
bias in news reporting is essential for a fair society, as me-
dia has the power to shape voting behavior (Saez-Trumper
et al., 2013).
Social information streams, i.e., status updates from
social networking sites, have emerged as a popular means
of information sharing. Political discussions on these plat-
forms are becoming an increasingly relevant source of po-
litical information, often also used as a source of quotes
for media outlets (Ju¨rgens et al., 2011). Traditional me-
dia are declining in their gatekeeping role to determine the
agenda and select which issues and viewpoints reach their
audiences (Bruns, 2011). Internet users have moved from
scanning traditional media such as newspapers and televi-
sion to using the Internet, in particular social networking
sites (An et al., 2012). Social networking sites are thus
now acting as gatekeepers (Bozdag, 2013).
Communication theorists argue that the traditional me-
dia are declining in their gatekeeping role to determine
what is “newsworthy” and select which issues and view-
points will reach their audiences Bruns (2011). It is often
argued that the Internet, by promoting equal access to
diverging preferences and opinions in society, actually in-
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creases information diversity. Many scholars characterize
the online media landscape as the “age of plenty, with
an almost infinite choice and unparalleled pluralization of
voices that have access to the public sphere (Karppinen,
2009). Some argue that social media will disrupt the tra-
ditional elite control of media and amplify the political
voice of non-elites and minorities (Castells, 2011).Still oth-
ers claim that tools such as Twitter are neutral spaces for
collaborative news coverage operated by third parties out-
side the journalism industry. As a result, the information
curated through collaborative action on such social media
platforms should be expected to be drawn from a diverse,
multi-perspectival range of sources (Bruns, 2011). Some
further claim that platforms such as Twitter are neutral
communication spaces, and offer a unique environment in
which journalists are free to communicate virtually any-
thing to anyone, beyond many of the natural constraints
posed by organizational norms that are existing in tradi-
tional media (Lasorsa et al., 2012).
On the other hand, there are skeptical voices that argue
that the Internet has not fundamentally changed the con-
centrated structure typical of mass media, but reflects the
previously recognized inequalities (Karppinen, 2009). It is
also argued that it has brought about new forms of exclu-
sion and hierarchy (Suoranta & Vade´n, 2009). While it has
increased some sort of political participation, it has em-
powered a small set of elites and they still strongly shape
how political material is presented and accessed (Hindman,
2008). Others have pointed out the danger of “cyberbalka-
nization”” caused by the Internet(Sunstein, 2002; Pariser,
2011). They argue that the filters we choose on the Inter-
net, or the filters that are imposed upon us will weaken the
democratic process. This is because it will allow citizens to
join into groups that share their own views and values, and
cut themselves off from any information that might chal-
lenge their beliefs. Group deliberation among like-minded
people can create polarization; individuals may lead each
other in the direction of error and falsehood, simply be-
cause of the limited argument pool and the operation of
social influences.
It is thus very important to verify whether viewpoint
diversity is diminishing in social media and whether cyber-
balkanization indeed occurs. There are empirical studies
that have observed a high level of information diversity in
Twitter and Facebook, mainly due to retweets and weak-
ties (Bakshy et al., 2012; An et al., 2011; Sun et al., 2013).
While being very valuable contributions to the literature,
these studies often focus on American users and they de-
fine information diversity either as “novelty”, or “source
diversity”. However, as we will show below, novel infor-
mation does not necessarily contribute to information di-
versity and highly competitive media markets with many
sources may still result in excessive sameness of media con-
tents. As we will argue, marginalized members of segre-
gated groups, structurally underprivileged actors and mi-
norities must receive special attention and just measuring
number of available sources will not guarantee viewpoint
diversity.
In this paper, we contribute with a framework to an-
alyze and understand the impact of political culture in
Twitter. Rather than reducing the concept viewpoint di-
versity to a single quantity or metric, we introduce differ-
ent dimensions of viewpoint diversity, based on previous
studies and the theory from communication studies and
political philosophy. In addition, we provide a set of new
metrics and operationalize them. Finally, we present the
result of a case study we performed for Dutch and Turkish
Twitter users using this framework. We show that minor-
ity users cannot reach a large percentage of the studied
Turkish Twitter users and political culture is making a
difference.
2. Empirical Studies of Information Diversity in
Social Media
An empirical study performed by Facebook suggests
that online social networks may increase the spread of
novel information and of diverse viewpoints. According
to Bakshy (2012), even though people are more likely to
consume and share information that comes from close con-
tacts that they interact with frequently, the vast major-
ity of information comes from contacts that they interact
with infrequently. These so-called “weak-ties” (Granovet-
ter, 1981) are also more likely to share novel information.
However, there are some concerns with this study. First,
Facebook does not provide open access to everyone, thus
we can not repeat or reproduce the results using Facebook
data. Second, our weak ties give us access to new stories
that we would not otherwise have seen, but these stories
might not be different ideologically from our own general
worldview. They might be novel information, but not par-
ticularly diverse. The concepts serendipity, diversity and
novelty are different from each other (Sun et al., 2013).
The Facebook research does not indicate whether we en-
counter and engage with news that opposes our own beliefs
through “weak-links”.
Twitter, with its API, provides an excellent environ-
ment for information diversity research. An et al. (2012)
observe extreme polarization among media sources in Twit-
ter. In another study, they found that, when direct sub-
scription is considered alone, most Twitter users receive
only biased political views they agree with (An et al.,
2011). However, they note that the news media land-
scape changes dramatically under the influence of retweets,
broadening the opportunity for users to receive updates
from politically diverse media outlets. Sun et al. (2013)
performed an empirical study using statistical models to
identify serendipity in Twitter and Weibo. Using like-
lihood ratio test and by measuring unexpectedness and
relevance, they observe high levels of serendipity in in-
formation diffusion in microblogging communities. Saez-
Trumper et al. (2013) found that political bias is evident in
social media, in terms of the distribution of tweets that dif-
ferent stories receive. Further, statement bias is evident in
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social media; a more opinionated and negative language is
used than the one used in traditional media. Twitter users
are more interested in what is happening directly around
them and what is happening to those around them. While
communities talk about a broad range of news, Twitter
users dedicate most of their tweets to a few of them (Saez-
Trumper et al., 2013). Wei et al. (2013) found that indi-
vidual journalists have the strongest influence on Twitter
for UK users. Further, they observed that all influential
British Twitter users (mainstream media, journalists and
celebrities) display some kind of bias towards a particular
political party in their tweets. Jurgens et al. (2011) show
that certain individual German Twitter users act as gate-
keepers, especially in the distribution of political informa-
tion. Those users are also not neutral hubs. They tend to
curate political information and post messages that they
find important (Ju¨rgens et al., 2011).
3. Theory
In this section, we first give a short overview “infor-
mation diversity” and explain why it is a vital value for
a democratic society. Later, we show different dimensions
of this value and show how it can be defined.
3.1. Information Diversity
A cyberbalkanized Internet or “filter bubble” is not
acceptable in different models of modern democracy. Ag-
gregative versions of democracy hold that legitimacy lies in
the fair counting of votes casted by informed voters Held
(2006). Deliberative democrats on the other hand hold
that a decision is only legitimate if it is determined by
fair, informed deliberations (Fishkin, 1993; Cohen, 2009).
Because no set of values or preferences can claim to be
correct by themselves, they must be justified and tested
through social encounters which take the point of view of
others into account (Held, 2006). In addition to the nor-
mative value of discussion, information-sharing is required
for many of the practical benefits that proponents of de-
liberation hope deliberative institutions will provide, such
as higher quality policy, greater appreciation of the views
of the opposing side, cultural pluralism and citizen wel-
fare (Napoli, 1999). According to deliberative democrats,
we must focus on why and how we come to adopt our
views, and whether they can be defended in a complex
social setting with people with opposed preferences. This
will complement voting, the necessary mode of participa-
tion, by a “conscious confrontation of one’s own point of
view with an opposing point of view, or of the multiplicity
of diverse viewpoints that the citizen, upon reflection, is
likely to discover within his or her own self”(Offe & Preuss,
1990). Under conditions of ideal deliberation, ‘no force ex-
cept that of the better argument is exercised’ (Habermas,
1975).
Information diversity is also an important concept in
communication studies. The freedom of media, a multi-
plicity of opinions and the good of society are inextricably
connected (Napoli, 1999). Free Press theory, a theory of
media diversity, states that we establish and preserve con-
ditions that provide many alternative voices, regardless
of intrinsic merit or truth, with the condition that they
emerge from those whom society is supposed to benefit its
individual members and constituent groups(van Cuilen-
burg & McQuail, 2003). What is good for the members
of the society can only be discovered by the free expres-
sion of alternative goals and solutions to problems, often
disseminated through media (Napoli, 1999).
While many scholars from different disciplines agree
that information diversity is an important value that we
should include in the design of institutions, policies and
online services, this value is often reduced to a single defi-
nition, such as “source diversity”, or “hearing the opinion
of the other side”. In the next subsections, we explain that
just having a deliberation is not enough, and that a bias
against arguments made by deliberators who are in the
minority in terms of their interests in the decision being
made can exist.
3.2. Dimension of Information Diversity
Following Napoli (1999), we may distinguish three dif-
ferent dimensions of information diversity. The first di-
mension is source diversity, which is diversity in terms of
outlets (cables and channel owners) or program produc-
ers (content owners). Content diversity consists of diver-
sity in format (program-type), demographic (in terms of
racial, ethnic, and gender), and idea-viewpoint (of social,
political and cultural perspectives). The third dimension,
exposure diversity, deals with audience reach and whether
users have actually consumed a diverse set of items.
In US media policy, with the “free marketplace of ideas”
theory, it is assumed that increasing source diversity will
increase content diversity and exposure diversity will fol-
low these two. American media policy consequently fo-
cuses on source diversity by way of competition and an-
titrust regulation (van Cuilenburg, 2002). However, whether
more media competition (more sources) really brings about
more media variety is highly debated and research address-
ing this relationship has not provided definitive evidence
of a systematic relationship (Napoli, 1999; van Cuilenburg,
1999; McQuail & van Cuilenburg, 1983; Karppinen, 2013).
Highly competitive media markets may still have low con-
tent diversity and media monopolies can produce highly
diverse supply of media content (van Cuilenburg, 2002).
It has also been argued that to fulfill the objectives of the
marketplace of ideas metaphor, policymakers need to focus
on exposure diversity. So, one should not look at availabil-
ity of different sources or content, but whether the public
consumes a diverse set of items (Napoli, 1999).
3.3. Minorities and Openness
Karppinen (2009) argues that the aim of media diver-
sity should not be the multiplication of genre, sources or
markets, but giving voice to different members of the soci-
ety. We should not see diversity as something that can be
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measured through the number of organizations or channels
or just “having two parties reach all citizens”. Karppinen
holds that we should focus on democratic distribution of
communicative power in the public sphere and whether
everyone has the chance and resources to get their voices
heard. Karppinen argues: “the key task for media pol-
icy from the radical pluralist perspective is to support and
enlarge the opportunities for structurally underprivileged
actors and to create space for the critical voices and so-
cial perspectives excluded from the systematic structures
of the market or state bureaucracy”(Karppinen, 2009).
If democratic processes and public policies exclude and
marginalize members of segregated groups from political
influence to the extent that privileged groups often domi-
nate the public policy process, they will magnify the harms
of segregation. These “minorities” must be politically mo-
bilized and included as equals in a process of discussing
issues (Young, 2002).
McQuail and van Cuilenburg (1983) propose to assess
media diversity by introducing two normative frameworks.
The norm of reflection checks whether “media content pro-
portionally reflects differences in politics, religion, culture
and social conditions in a more or less proportional way.
The norm of openness checks whether media “provide per-
fectly equal access to their channels for all people and all
ideas in society. If the population preferences were uni-
formly distributed over society, then satisfying the first
condition (reflection) would also satisfy the second condi-
tion (equal access). However, this is seldom the case (van
Cuilenburg, 1999). Often population preferences tend to-
ward the middle and mainstreams. In such cases, the
media will not satisfy the openness norm, and the pref-
erences of the minorities will not reach a larger public.
This is undesirable, because “social change usually be-
gins with minority views and movements (...) asymmetric
media provision of content may challenge majority prefer-
ences and eventually may open up majority preferences for
cultural change in one direction or another” (van Cuilen-
burg, 1999). Van Cuilenburg (1999) argues that the Inter-
net has to be assessed in terms of its ability to give open
access to new and creative ideas, opinions and knowledge
that the old media do not cover yet. Otherwise it will only
be “more of the same”.
4. Polarization in the Netherlands and Turkey
Before discussing methods and the results of our em-
pirical study that focused on Dutch and Turkish users, we
give a short overview of political diversity for those two
countries and explain why they are interesting for a case
study on information diversity.
4.1. the Netherlands
Pillarization (Dutch: “verzuiling”) is a process that
occurred in the Netherlands and reached its highest point
in 1950s. During this period, several ideological groups
making up Dutch society were systematically organized
as parallel complexes that were mutually segregated and
polarized (van Doorn, 1956; Post, 1989). As part of this
social apartheid dividing the population into subcultures,
political parties were used for political mobilization of the
ideologically and religiously defined groups and social ac-
tivities were concentrated within the particular categori-
cal group (Steininger, 1977). Few contact existed between
the different groups and internally the groups were tightly
organized (Lijphart, 1968). Elites at the ‘top’ level com-
municated, while the ones at the ‘bottom’ did not. Pillar-
ization had an effect on parental choice of an elementary
school for children, the voting for political parties and the
choice on which daily newspaper to read (Kruijt, 1962).
People belonging to a pillar retreated into their own orga-
nizations and entered into a ‘voluntary’ isolation, because
they perceive that values important to them were threat-
ened (Marsman, 1967).
Depillarization (Dutch: “ontzuiling”) started in mid
1960’s as a democratization process and pillarization has
lost much of its significance since the 1960’s as a result of
secularization and individualization. Even though depil-
larization has started, many institutional legacies in present-
day Netherlands still reflect its pillarized past, for example
in its public broadcasting system or in the school system
(Vink, 2007). The Netherlands continues to be a country
of minorities, which may be a main reason that consensus
seems so ingrained in the Dutch political culture (Peter
van der Hoek, 2000). The Dutch parliament currently has
12 political parties. Due to the very low chance of any
party gaining power alone, parties often form coalitions.
The Netherlands has created several media policies to
implement diversity in the media. The Media Monitor,
an independent institution, measures ownership concen-
tration, editorial concentration and audience preferences
(Aslama et al., 2007). It also measures diversity of televi-
sion programming on the basis of a content classification
system, by categorizing program output in categories like
news and information, education, drama, sports, etc. (Me-
diamonitor, 2013; van Cuilenburg, 2002).
4.2. Turkey
Turkey has regularly held free and competitive elec-
tions since 1946. The country has alternated between a
two-party political system and a multi-party system. Elec-
toral politics has often been dominated by highly ideolog-
ical rival parties and military inventions changed the po-
litical landscape several times (Tessler & Altinoglu, 2004).
Elections in 2002 led to a two-party parliament, partially
due to a ten per cent threshold. The Justice and Develop-
ment Party1 (AKP) won the elections and still is the ruling
party, having an absolute majority. The parliament is cur-
rently formed by 4 political parties. While AKP has 59%
1Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi
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of the MP’s, secular Republican People’s Party2 (CHP)
has 24%.
AKP’s dominance and the despair and sense of marginal-
ization felt by its opponents threaten to create a polit-
ical polarization. Muftuler-Bas and Keyman (2012) ar-
gue that “many other polarizing social and political strug-
gles remain unresolved in Turkey, and mutually antago-
nistic groups remain unreconciled. This social and po-
litical polarization remains potentially explosive and re-
duces the capacity for social consensus and political com-
promise”. Similarly Unver (2011, p.2) claims that “the so-
ciety is pushed towards two extremes that are independent
of party politics. (...) Competing narratives and ‘realities’
clash with each other so intensely, that the resultant effect
is one of alienation and ‘otherness’ within the society.”
Some scholars argue that, the top-down imposition of
concepts such as democracy, political parties and parlia-
ment as part of westernization efforts is causing the socio-
political polarization in Turkey (Altintas, 2003). Agirdir
(2010) argues that “the system does not breed from the
diverse interests and demands of the society, but around
the values and interests of a party leader and the nar-
row crew around her”. Economic voting behavior, religios-
ity, and modern versus traditional orientation seem to be
the strongest drivers of polarization (Yilmaz et al., 2012).
Some argue that, after 2011 polarization has increased
and reached its highest points in Turkish history (Ozturk,
2013). The difference of opinion between different clus-
ters about secularity, tolerance and political change issues
in total contradiction of each other, therefore a danger of
absolute social polarization is imminent (Agirdir, 2010).
Kiris (2011) observes an identity-based polarization, be-
tween secularists and islamists, between Turkish national-
ists and Kurdish Ethnic Nationalists, and between Alevis
and Sunnis (different sects of Islam).
Turkish Radio Television Supreme Council (RTUK)
was established in order to control whether Turkish lan-
guage, Turkish history, historical values, Turkish way of
life, thoughts and feelings are being given a significant
place in broadcasting programs (Acar, 2004). RTUK is
sometimes referred as “the Censure Board” (Mu¨ftu¨ler Bac¸,
2005) and its decisions of penalizing the broadcasters have
been criticized domestically and internationally (Baris, 2007;
Demir & Ben-Zadok, 2007). RTUK does not have a diver-
sity policy and the lack of diversity in programme-making
is said to undermine the quality of the audio-visual media
(Baris, 2007).
4.3. Conclusion
In short, The Netherlands and Turkey are two differ-
ent countries in terms of political landscape and diversity
policy. The Dutch society is less polarized than it was half
a century ago, while the Turkish society is thought to be
heavily polarized. The Dutch Parliament contains many
2Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
political parties, no party has absolute power to govern
alone. Turkey, on the other hand has few political parties
represented in the government and the ruling party has
almost 60% of all the seats. Further, the Dutch media is
regulated with a diversity policy. While Turkey has a sim-
ilar institution, it acts more as a censor board and does
not employ an active diversity policy. If the social net-
working platforms mirror the society, then we can expect
the Dutch users to receive more diverse content, while the
Turkish users to be more polarized and have a less diverse
newsfeed.
5. Method
In this section we provide our method of data collec-
tion, present our research model and the metrics we oper-
ationalized to measure information diversity.
5.1. Data collection
In January 2013, over a period of more than one month
we crawled microblogging data via the Twitter’s REST
and streaming APIs3. We started from a seed set of Dutch
and Turkish Twitter users Us, who mainly publish news-
related tweets. We have selected different types of users
including mainstream news media, journalists, individual
bloggers and politicians. The list of these “influential”
users were picked up from different ranking sites. For
the Dutch ranking, we used Peerreach4, Twittergids5 and
Haagse Twitter-stolp6. For Turkish ranking, we used Twit-
terTurk7 and TwitterTakip8.
This resulted in two lists for Turkey and the Nether-
lands, both containing seed users categorized in political
groups, which differed per country. We mapped the polit-
ical leaning of Dutch seed users into five groups and the
political leaning of Turkish seed users into nine groups. We
did this using a number of public sources (Krouwel, 2008;
van der Eijk, 2000; Trendlight, 2012; Carkoglu & Kalay-
cioglu, 2007). Later, we defined some of the seed users
as a “minority”. We did this by selecting seed users who
belong to a political party that is either not represented
in the parliament, or is represented with few MP’s. We
also included MP’s of a large political party who belong
to an ethnic minority. That makes for instance the Kur-
dish Party BDP and its MP’s a minority in Turkey, while
we consider the Greens as a minority in the Netherlands.
See Appendix A for a list of minorities. Both user groups
defined as minorities create about 15% of the all observed
tweets for both countries.
3https://dev.twitter.com/
4http://peerreach.com/lists/politics/nl
5http://twittergids.nl/
6http://alleplanten.net/twitter/site/de-resultaten/belangrijke-
personen/
7http://twitturk.com/twituser/users/turk
8http://www.twittertakip.com/
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By monitoring the Twitter streams of Us, we were able
to add another set of users Un, who followed and retweeted
at least 5 items from users in Us. After removing users who
were involved in spam, we had 1981 Dutch users and 1746
Turkish users. After crawling seed user tweets and identify
the retweets made by their followers, we operationalized
various metrics. In the following subsections, we explain
the translation of research questions into metrics.
5.2. Research questions
The main question in this research is the following:
“Does offline political segregation affect information di-
versity in Twitter?”. To answer this question, we have
provided some sub-questions.
1. Q1- Seed User Interaction: Do seed users from
one end of the political spectrum ever tweet links
from another category? Do they reply to each other?
The results of this question is relevant to the previ-
ously conducted studies that studied media bias on
Twitter, such as Wei et al. (2013)
2. Q2 - Source Diversity: Is the newsfeed of so-
cial media users diverse? Are they receiving updates
from a diverse set of users? Does indirect exposure
(e.g., via retweets or weak-links) increase diversity
marginally? Result of these questions are relevant
to the previously conducted studies, such as An et
al.’s (2011).
3. Q3- Output Diversity: Do users share items from
a diverse set of users or mainly from the same politi-
cal category? This question is relevant to the frame-
work provided by Napoli, which we have mentioned
in Section 3.2.
4. Q4 - Openness/Minority Diversity: Can mi-
norities reach the social media users, so that “equal
access” principle is satisfied? Or can only the ”popu-
lar” reach a bigger public? This question is relevant
to the normative theory of McQuail & van Cuilen-
burg (1983) and Karppinen (2013), which we dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.
5. Q5 - Input-Output Correlation: Do users post
political messages whose political position reflects
the political position of those messages that the users
receive? Or do the messages they choose to retweet
show a political position significantly skewed from
the political position of the messages which they re-
ceive? Result of this question is relevant to the pre-
viously conducted studies such as Jurgens et al.’s
(2011).
5.3. Entropy
While translating the concepts introduced in the pre-
vious subsection into metrics, we apply the following en-
tropy formula used by van Cuilenburg (2007) to measure
traditional media diversity, which is based on the work of
Shannon (1948) :
− (
∑
(pi log pi)/log(n)) (1)
In van Cuilenburg & van der Wurff (2007), pi repre-
sents the proportion of items of content type category i. n
represents the number of content type categories. We use
this formula for calculating source diversity and exposure
diversity in our Twitter study. For instance in source di-
versity, pi represents incoming tweets from seed users with
a specific political stance, while n represents all possible
categories. As a result of this formula, the user will have
a diversity between 0 and 1, where 0 represents minimum
diversity and 1 represents maximum diversity. Figure 1
shows a user that receives equal amount of tweets (20)
from all political categories and has an incoming diversity
of 1. The user only retweets from one political category
(10 from Category 1), therefore she/he has an outgoing
diversity of 0.
Figure 1: Applying entropy
5.4. Translating Research Questions into Metrics
Source Diversity: For each user, we used Equation 1 to
calculate his/her source diversity. For a user A, we
compare the tweets published by A’s direct followees
(people A follows) from different groups of which the
political leanings have been categorized as discussed
above (See Figure 2). This gives us a user’s direct
input entropy. We then also added the tweets A gets
through retweets and investigated if A receives more
diverse information through indirect media exposure
(See Figure 3). This provides us a user’s indirect
input entropy. In both of figures, arrows show the
information flow.
Output Diversity: To measure what the user is sharing
after she/he was exposed to different incoming infor-
mation, we used Equation 1 to compare the retweets
and replies she/he makes for each political category.
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Figure 2: Direct source diversity
Figure 3: Indirect source diversity
Figure 4: Minority access
Figure 5: Input-Output Correlation
Openness/Minority Diversity: For this definition of di-
versity, we first defined all seed users who belong to
a political party that is either not represented in the
parliament, or is represented with few MP’s. We
also included MP’s of a large political party who be-
long to an ethnic minority. That makes for instance
the Kurdish Party BDP and its MP’s a minority in
Turkey, while we consider the Greens as a minor-
ity in the Netherlands. See Appendix A for a list
of minorities. Both users defined as minorities cre-
ate about 15% of the all observed tweets for both
countries.
We then looked whether the user is receiving mi-
nority tweets directly or indirectly. For instance, in
Figure 4, User A is receiving minority tweets by di-
rect subscription, but also indirectly via User B. We
defined two metrics to measure minority access. We
first look at the ratio of minority tweets a user gets
out of all minority tweets:
# received minority tweets
# all published minority tweets
(2)
We later calculate the ratio of minority tweets in a
users’ timeline
# received minority tweets
#received tweets from seeds
(3)
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Input-Output Correlation: For each user in our sam-
ple we look whether the maximum number of the po-
litical position of the messages retweeted by a user
is significantly skewed from the political position of
the messages that she/he receives.
max(incoming political category) == max(outgoing political category)
(4)
For instance, Figure 5 shows a biased user which re-
ceives most items from category 1, and also retweets mainly
from category 1.
6. Results
This section shows the results for the defined metrics.
We tested statistical significance of our results with a two-
tailed t-Test where the significance level was set to α =
0.01 unless otherwise noted.
Figures 6 and 7 show the distribution of the seed users
for both countries. Figures 8 and 9 show the distribution
of regular users. We see that our selection of popular users
covers the political spectrum and it is not concentrated on
a single political category. We have used several sources
to do the seed user categorization (Krouwel, 2008; van der
Eijk, 2000; Trendlight, 2012; Krouwel, 2012, 2008; Baris,
2007). We used the retweet behavior of the users to as-
sign them to a political category to identify their political
stance.
6.1. Seed User Interaction
To answer research question Q1, Tables 1a and 1b show
the retweet and reply behavior of seed users. Each row
shows the category of users who retweet an item or reply
to another user. The columns show the source of their
retweet or the user they interact with. We observe that
73% of the left seed users retweet only from left users and
reply to left users, while 72% of the right users do the same.
The situation is more extreme for Turkish seed users: 93%
of left seed users only retweet from and reply to left users,
while 94% of the right seed users show the same behavior.
6.2. Source and Output Diversity
Table 2a shows the results for research questions Q2
and Q3. Here we see that on a scale of 0 to 1, the di-
versity of the incoming tweets for an average user is ap-
proximately 0.6 and the results are not very different for
both countries. While diversity is not perfect, we do not
observe a true cyberbalkanization and we do not observe
a significant difference between two countries. We observe
that indirect communication (retweets) does increase di-
versity, but not dramatically. Figure 10 and Figure 11
show the distribution of source diversity among users. We
observe that, indirect communication decreases the num-
ber of users who have a diversity approaching 0 for both
countries. Approximately 27% of the Dutch and 29% of
the Turkish users have an indirect diversity less than 0.5.
Figure 6: Dutch seed user distribution
Figure 7: Turkish seed user distribution
Figure 8: Dutch user distribution
Figure 9: Turkish user distribution
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However, if we look at the diversity of an average user’s
output, we see much lower numbers. As Table 2b shows, on
a scale of 0 to 1, retweet diversity is 0.43 for the Dutch and
0.40 for the Turkish users. If we look at reply diversity,
it is 0.42 for the Dutch and 0.29 for the Turkish users.
Figures 12 and 13 show the distribution of output (retweet
and reply) diversity among the population. About 55% of
the Dutch and 66% of the Turkish users have a retweet
diversity lower than 0.5, and about 17% of the Dutch and
12% of the Turkish users have a retweet diversity lower
than 0.01 (p < 0.001). About 61% of the Dutch and 77%
of the Turkish users have a reply diversity lower than 0.5,
and about 24% of the Dutch and 26% of the Turkish users
have a reply diversity lower than 0.01 (p < 0.001). This
means that the users show bias for both their retweet and
reply preferences and especially the Turkish reply diversity
is quite low.
6.3. Opennes/Minority Diversity
Table 2d shows the results for the research question Q4.
First row, which we call “minority reach” shows the result
for Equation 2 and the second row, which we call “minority
exposure” shows the result for Equation 3. Minority reach
measures how many percent of all the produced tweets
by minorities reach an average user. Minority exposure
checks the ratio of minority tweets in a user’s newsfeed.
We observe that an average Dutch Twitter users will re-
ceive 15% of the produced minority tweets, whereas an
average Turkish user will only receive 2% of them. Later,
we observe that minority tweets make up 23% of an av-
erage Dutch users’ incoming tweets from seed users, while
it only makes up 2% for a Turkish user. Figures 14 and
15 show the distribution of users for this metric. Here
we observe a significant difference between two countries
(p < 0.001). About 55% of the Turkish users have a minor-
ity exposure under 0.05 and 57% of them have a minority
reach under 0.05. The percentages are much lower for the
Dutch users: 14% and 23% respectively. This means that
more than half of the Turkish users are missing almost all
the updates produced by the minorities and their newsfeed
contains almost no minority tweets at all. This includes
indirect minority tweets thanks to retweets done by their
friends.
6.4. Input-Output Correlation
Table 2c shows the results for the research question
Q5. The first row shows the number of users whose out-
put correlates with their input. Such users make up 33%
of the Dutch and 47% of the Turkish userbase. Further,
if we only consider a bias towards a certain political cate-
gory that is higher than 15% (for both input and output),
26% of the Dutch and 36% of the Turkish users show this
behavior.
Table 1: Seed user bias
(a) Netherlands
User / Source Left Right
Left 73% 27%
Right 28% 72%
(b) Turkey
User / Source Left Right
Left 93% 7%
Right 6% 94%
Table 2: Different dimensions of diversity. NL = the
Netherlands, TR = Turkey.
(a) Source Diversity (on a
scale of 0 to 1)
NL TR
Direct 0.63 0.58
Indirect 0.68 0.62
(b) Output Diversity (on a
scale of 0 to 1)
NL TR
Retweet 0.43 0.40
Reply 0.42 0.29
(c) Input-Output Correlation
NL TR
# users 657 828
% users 33% 47%
(d) Openness/Minority Diversity
NL TR
minority reach 15% 2%
minority exposure 23% 2%
% users under <0.05 reach 14% 57%
% users under <0.05 exposure 23% 55%
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Figure 10: Direct source diversity
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Users
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
In
pu
t E
nt
ro
py
Dutch
Turkish
Figure 11: Indirect source diversity
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Figure 12: Output diversity (retweet diversity)
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Figure 13: Output diversity (reply diversity)
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Figure 15: Minority Exposure
7. Discussion
In this study we have shown different dimensions of
diversity and discussed an additional dimension, namely
minority access. This dimension has not been previously
been subjected to large-scale quantitative validation. How-
ever, as many communication scholars and philosophers
have argued, while the media should reflect the preferences
present in the society, it should also allow equal access to
everyone, including those whose common social location
tends to exclude them from political participation. Public
life needs to include differently situated voices, not just
the majority.
We have shown that different definitions of diversity
can be operationalized in different metrics and the ques-
tion whether “the filter bubble exists in social media” will
have different answers depending on the metric and po-
litical segregation of the observed country. For instance,
according to the results of our study, source diversity does
not differ much for Turkish and Dutch users and we cer-
tainly cannot observe a bubble. However, if we consider
output, then we see that the diversity is much lower. Fur-
ther, if we consider the minority access as a diversity met-
ric, we see that minorities cannot reach a large percentage
of the Turkish population.
Twitter, with its 140 character limitation, is not the
ideal platform for deliberation. However, having a diverse
information stream in Twitter is still important, as it can
serve as an input for deliberation elsewhere. Information
intermediaries such as Twitter could have a considerable
influence in nudging people towards more valuable and di-
verse choices (Helberger, 2011). Media diversity has been
an important policy objective for the regulation of tradi-
tional media (van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003). Journal-
ism ethics requires the newspapers to have a balanced and
fair coverage of news and opinions and editors and jour-
nalists to minimize bias in their filtering decisions. In the
abundance of digital online information and algorithmic
filters to deal with information overload, bias should also
be minimized and ideas and opinions of minorities should
not be lost.
Design choices in software codes and other forms of
information politics still largely determine the way infor-
mation is made available and who can speak to whom
under what condition (Karppinen, 2009). According to
Karppinen (2009), it is important to make decisions about
standards, because those “can have lasting influence on
media pluralism, even if they are not necessarily recog-
nized as sites of media policy as such”. However, making
minority voices reach a wider public is no easy matter.
While identifying minorities and their valuable tweets is
no easy task, showing these items to “challenge averse”
users is a real challenge (Munson & Resnick, 2010). For
instance Munson et al.(2013) provided people with feed-
back about the political lean of their reading behaviors
and found that such feedback had only a small effect on
nudging people to read more diversely. More research is
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needed to understand how users’ reading behavior change
and to determine the conditions that would allow such a
change.
Further, normative questions arise while making de-
sign decisions. When designing diverse recommendation
systems, it is definitely a challenge to determine which
view is “valid”. For instance, should a recommendation
system show all viewpoints in the climate change debate,
if some viewpoints are not empirically validated or simply
seen as false by the majority of the experts? Should a
viewpoint get equal attention even if it provides no infor-
mation or only contains arguments with fallacies? These
questions would need to be addressed by a good ethical
analysis before design decisions of such systems are made.
8. Limitations
This study has several limitations. First of all, next to
the accounts of traditional media outlets on Twitter, we
also selected politicians and bloggers. While they mainly
tweet political matters, it is possible that they have shared
personal and non political matters as well.
Second, while the results give us an idea on the polit-
ical landscape of the studied countries, Twitter does not
represent ‘all people’. As boyd and Crawford (2011) have
stated, “many journalists and researchers refer to ‘peo-
ple’ and ‘Twitter users’ as synonymous (...) Some users
have multiple accounts. Some accounts are used by mul-
tiple people. Some people never establish an account, and
simply access Twitter via the web”. Therefore we cannot
conclude that our sample represent the real population of
the studied countries.
Third, input-output correlation does not always impli-
cate that the volume of the content affects the items users
share. Users might already be biased before they select
their sources and can therefore follow more from certain
sources and share from certain categories.
Fourth, users will make different uses of Twitter. Some
might use it as its primary news source, therefore following
mainstream items, while others will use it to be informed of
the opposing political view or to find items missing in the
traditional media. Therefore, we do not know why some
users only follow sources from a specific political category.
More qualitative studies are needed.
Fifth, retweets in Twitter can be made for different
purposes. There is a difference between endorsement retweets
(created by pushing the retweet button) and informal tweets
(where users include most of the same text often prefixed
by ‘RT’ or similar but also add their own comments before
or after the tweet). These two actions measure a different
interaction. Informal retweets and replies could also ex-
press disagreement and show us deliberation. In order to
make a distinction between these two types of tweets, we
need semantic analysis. We are not aware of the availabil-
ity of such tools for the Turkish language, therefore we
were unable to perform such an analysis. While informa-
tion diversity is important not only for deliberative models
of democracy, it would be very useful to study deliberation
on Twitter by using such tools in the future.
Sixth, users could retweet or reply with bad intentions,
such as trolling. For retweets, we only measured users’
retweets to original tweets created by seed users. We as-
sume that, those powerful political actors would not take
part in trolling. Users can retweet a seed user’s tweet ran-
domly or for trolling purposes. Same issue can manifest
itself in replies. Since we did not perform a semantic anal-
ysis, this remains a limitation.
9. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have introduced a framework that
lists metrics used in the previous social media analytics
studies and added new ones using the theory from other
fields. As one of the outcomes of the results from the pre-
vious section, we showed how minority access is missing
from the typical dimensions of viewpoint diversity studied
by computer scientists and the impact it has on viewpoint
diversity analysis. To our knowledge, this is the first work
that provides an overview of all the used metrics in so-
cial media analytics literature and the first study to apply
an “openness” metric. Building on this framework, new
studies can be performed for different countries and po-
litical cultures. For instance, Belgium, a country where
different languages are spoken in different regions is an an
interesting case to apply our framework.
In the recent months, Turkey experienced several po-
litical protests that spontaneously erupted against the de-
struction of trees and the building of a shopping mall at
Gezi Park in Taksim Square and large scale corruptions
within the government. Twitter and Facebook played a vi-
tal role during these movements and became the only com-
munication medium when traditional media performed self-
censorship (Dorsey, 2013; Hammond & Angell, 2013; Ok-
tem, 2013). It would be very useful to see whether the
political stance of our observed users have changed. It is
also challenging to identify the opinion leaders during these
movements and find whether they communicate with each
other or form their own “bubbles”. It is further valuable
to see if minorities were able to reach a wider public during
those protests. A hashtag based political communication
or an extension of our methodology could bring new in-
sights.
Our study was focused on Twitter and studied whether
users have put themselves in bubbles by following indi-
viduals from only one end of the political spectrum and
showed a biased sharing behavior. Twitter itself does not
employ a personalization algorithm in a user’s timeline.
However other social networking platforms, such as Face-
book, do use a personalization algorithm and filter cer-
tain information on user’s behalf (Bozdag, 2013). Future
studies can perform black-box testing techniques to deter-
mine whether filters used by these platforms lead to bub-
bles (See Ju¨rgens (2013)). Creating multiple profiles while
12
modifying certain factors, such as political affiliation, age,
location, etc. can help us detect bubbles, if they exist.
Appendix A: List of Minorities
Dutch minorities: Keklik Yucel, SGP, Khadija Arib,
Vera Bergkamp, Sadet Karabulut, Farshad Bashir, Tanja
Jadnanansing, Piratenpartij NLD, Partij van de Dieren,
Fatma Koser Kaya, ChristenUnie, Groenlinks, Marianne
Thieme, Femke Halsema.
Turkish minorities: Ayca Soylemez, Evrensel, Aydin-
lik, Ozgur Gundem, Pinar Ogunc, Bianet, Sebahat Tun-
cel, Sol Haber Portali, Halkin Gazetesi Birgun Yildirim
Turker, BDPGenelMerkez, Ufuk Uras, Selahattin Demir-
tas, Sirri Sureyya Onder, Sinan Ogan, Hasip Kaplan.
Note that both minorities create about 15% of all tweets
produced by seed users.
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